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Sexual Assault Cases in the Supreme
Court of Canada: Losing Sight of
Substantive Equality?
Emma Cunliffe
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper forms part of a 30-year retrospective on the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 its successes and challenges. In
particular, I have been invited to consider the contemporary role of the
Charter value of equality in protecting women against crimes of violence. This paper argues that section 15 of the Charter has prompted
reforms that protect women as complainants in sexual assault cases and
considers the effectiveness of these reforms.
Part II supplies a history of the relationships between consent, trial
procedure, and substantive equality in sexual assault law. I argue that
substantive equality has had a significant effect on both substance and
procedure. Part III examines the impact of these reforms by considering
the extent to which substantive equality has infused judicial reasoning
and fact determination in contested sexual assault cases. Specifically, I
focus on the three sexual assault cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Canada in 2011.2 By examining these cases from trial to final appeal, it is
possible to trace the development, refinement and adoption of equalitybased reasoning about particular complainants. Analyzing Supreme Court


Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law. This article is written in honour of my colleague Professor Christine Boyle QC on the occasion of her retirement from
UBC. Her contribution to legal understandings of violence against women has been enormous.
Thank you to Susan Boyd and the anonymous reviewers of this manuscript for helpful comments on
an earlier version, and to James Stribopoulos and Benjamin Berger for including me in the 2011
Osgoode Constitutional Cases Review Conference. I am also grateful for the support of the Centre
for Feminist Legal Studies at UBC.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
R. v. A. (J.A.), [2011] S.C.J. No. 17, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 628 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “A.
(J.A.)”]; R. v. A. (J.), [2011] S.C.J. No. 28, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 440 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “A. (J.)”]; R. v.
H. (J.M.), [2011] S.C.J. No. 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “H. (J.M.)”].
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of Canada cases allows a consideration of reasoning that is more fully
argued than is often possible in trial courts, and also focuses on reasoning
that is most likely to provide a model for future cases. My analysis shows
that substantive equality reasoning has not yet infused judicial approaches to fact determination in sexual assault cases, and that individual
complainants are not yet fully protected against the operation of myths
and stereotypes when consent or credibility are at stake. I suggest in
conclusion that the Supreme Court of Canada has a leading role to play
in moving judicial reasoning towards a more egalitarian approach to fact
determination.

II. CONSENT, PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
While the legal questions varied, consent was the factual question at
the heart of each of the three cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Canada in 2011. This commonality speaks to the continued challenges of
proof at the trial level in sexual assault. The variation in the legal
questions brought forward to the Court demonstrates that consent raises
both substantive questions — for example, what are the limits of consent? — and procedural challenges — for example, how can the court
focus the trier of fact on the specific question of consent in this instance,
rather than judging sexual assault by the reputation or history of the
complainant?3 Before turning to the specific arguments made in A. (J.A.),4
A. (J.)5 and H. (J.M.),6 it may be helpful to introduce the substantive law
of consent and some of the most relevant procedural aspects of sexual
assault law, and to note the influence of section 15 of the Charter on both
of these dimensions.
On the substantive side, the contemporary statutory definition of
consent was introduced into the Criminal Code7 in 1992 after broad
consultation.8 Consent is now defined in section 273.1(1) of the Criminal
Code to mean “the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in
3
On the interconnectedness of substantive and procedural law, see Christine Boyle &
Marilyn MacCrimmon, “The Constitutionality of Bill C-49: Analyzing Sexual Assault as if Equality
Really Mattered” (1998) 41 Crim. L.Q. 198, at 198-200 [hereinafter “Boyle & MacCrimmon”].
4
Supra, note 2.
5
Supra, note 2.
6
Supra, note 2.
7
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
8
Boyle & MacCrimmon, supra, note 3; Lise Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent in
Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women” (2008) 41 Akron L.
Rev. 865 [hereinafter “Gotell, ‘Rethinking Affirmative Consent’”].
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the sexual activity in question”. Subsection 273.1(2) sets out a variety of
circumstances in which valid consent is not obtained, including, for
example: incapacity to consent; expressed lack of consent; and an
expressed desire to discontinue the activity. Section 273.2 provides that it
is not a defence that the accused believed the complainant was consenting, if the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent or
if his belief arose from self-induced intoxication, recklessness or wilful
blindness.
Feminist commentators hailed the 1992 definition of consent as enlivening the potential for “a contextual analysis of the power relations
within which sexual interactions unfold”.9 Specifically, the definition
imagines an exchange in which the participants take steps to ascertain
and abide by the wishes of their partner, and the grey area between “yes”
and “no” is correspondingly diminished. Where charges are laid, the
Criminal Code directs the trier of fact to look for agreement rather than
relying upon acquiescence, and particularly to consider the circumstances in which mere acquiescence might be more likely to have
occurred.10 Feminists felt that the amendments responded to their
criticisms of sexual assault law as “reflecting a pervasive distrust of
women and children, and as facilitating male sexual access to them
regardless of their wishes”.11 This mistrust, and the corresponding
inadequacies in the criminal justice response to sexual violence, were
regarded by many commentators as failures to make good on the section
15 Charter promise that all individuals have the right to equal benefit and
protection of the law.12 The preamble to the 1992 amendments specifically cited grave concern about the incidence of violence against women
and children and Parliament’s intention “to promote and help to ensure
the full protection of the rights guaranteed under section 7 and 15 of the
[Charter]”.13
The leading case on consent in sexual assault law is R. v. Ewanchuk.14 In Ewanchuk, the Supreme Court of Canada held that absence of
9

Id., at 868.
R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] S.C.J. No. 10, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ewanchuk”]. See also s. 265(3), which defines the circumstances in which consent is vitiated for all
assaults.
11
Boyle & MacCrimmon, supra, note 3, at 199.
12
Id., at 200; see also Sheilah Martin, “Some Constitutional Considerations on Sexual
Violence Against Women” (1994) 32 Alta. L. Rev. 535, at 547-51.
13
Canada, House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-49, An Act to Amend the
Criminal Code (Sexual Assault), 34th Parl., 3rd Sess., 1992 Preamble (passed by House of
Commons June 15, 1992), cited in A. (J.), supra, note 2 (Appellant’s Factum, at para. 26).
14
Supra, note 10.
10
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consent “is subjective and determined by reference to the complainant’s
subjective internal state of mind towards the touching, at the time it
occurred”.15 Where an individual has said no to sexual contact:
[t]he accused cannot rely on the mere lapse of time or the
complainant’s silence or equivocal conduct to indicate that there has
been a change of heart and that consent now exists, nor can he engage
in further sexual touching to “test the waters”.16

Furthermore, a clear assertion of “no” is not required and the trier of fact
should focus on whether “yes” was communicated to the accused.
Collectively, the section 273.1 definition of consent and Supreme Court
of Canada precedent provide a strong consent standard. Consent is
determined solely by the complainant’s state of mind; and the accused’s
capacity to argue mistaken belief in consent is conditioned by a requirement to make reasonable efforts to ascertain consent. Parliament and
some judges expressly link these standards to women and children’s
equality rights and to the related principles of universal dignity and
autonomy.
A strong substantive definition of consent is most effective when
accompanied by procedural rules that focus the court’s attention on the
specific question of whether this complainant consented to the sexual
activity that forms the subject of this charge. Parliament has developed
procedural rules that are designed to protect the trial process from the
operation of prejudicial generalizations about rape complainants.17
Reforms were also implemented to balance complainants’ privacy and
equality interests with the right of the accused to make full answer and
defence.18 While early legislative efforts were ruled unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court,19 a jurisprudence of equality gradually emerged from
the reasoning in several cases and was explicitly adopted by a majority in
R. v. Mills.20 For present purposes, the key aspect of this procedural law
15

Id., at para. 26.
Id., at para. 52.
17
Sections 276 and 277 Criminal Code.
18
This legislative history has been well canvassed elsewhere. For example, Boyle and
MacCrimmon, supra, note 3; Margaret Denike, “Myths of Women and the Rights of Man”
[hereinafter “Denike”] in James Frederick Hodgson & Debra S. Kelley, eds., Sexual Violence:
Policies, Practices and Challenges in the United States and Canada (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002),
at 101.
19
R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Seaboyer”].
20
[1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mills”]. In R. v. Osolin,
[1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, at para. 166 (S.C.C.), Cory J. identified the potential
16
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is its focus on expelling certain unfair stereotypes about sexual assault
complainants from the trial process. Before turning to particular stereotypes, it is useful to consider the relationship between equality and
stereotyping.
Section 15 of the Charter protects substantive equality and envisages
that all individuals should receive the equal protection and benefit of the
law. In Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews,21 a majority of the
Court explained:
Recognizing that there will always be an infinite variety of personal
characteristics, capacities, entitlements and merits among those subject
to a law, there must be accorded, as nearly as may be possible, an
equality of benefit and protection and no more of the restrictions,
penalties or burdens imposed upon one than another.22

This desire to ensure an equal allocation of burdens and protection is
threatened by the operation of unfair stereotypes. Sophia Moreau
describes stereotyping as a process by which one group of people treats
another (the stereotyped group) as though certain generalizations or
classifications capture essential features of all individuals who belong to
the stereotyped group. Decisions made on the basis of such generalizations overlook the particular circumstances or attributes of individual
members of the group. Such decisions violate the principle of substantive
equality by denying individuals protection based on irrelevant considerations and by denying individuals the capacity to be judged on their own
circumstances and experience.23 The Court has emphasized “the role of
s. 15(1) in overcoming prejudicial stereotypes in society”.24
Turning to sexual assault, the Supreme Court first recognized the
dangers of myths and stereotypes in R. v. Seaboyer.25 Specifically, the
relevance of s. 15 to limiting cross-examination while stressing that it was “not determinative”; see
also R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.), and R. v. Darrach, [2000]
S.C.J. No. 46, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443 (S.C.C.). For further information about the pre-Mills case law,
see: Denike, supra, note 18; Elizabeth Sheehy, “Feminist Argumentation Before the Supreme Court
in R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme: The Sound of One Hand Clapping” (1991) 18 Melbourne U. L. Rev.
450 [hereinafter “Sheehy”]; and John McInnes & Christine Boyle, “Judging Sexual Assault Law
Against a Standard of Equality” (1995) 29 U.B.C. L. Rev. 341 [hereinafter “McInnes & Boyle”].
21
[1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.).
22
Id., at para. 26, per McIntyre J.
23
Sophia Moreau, “The Wrongs of Unequal Treatment” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike
& M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making Equality Rights Real, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009) 31, at
36-37.
24
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999]
1 S.C.R. 497, at para. 64 (S.C.C.).
25
Supra, note 19.
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Court identified that sexual history evidence was often admitted without
regard to relevance, and used by triers of fact to infer consent based on
the myths “that unchaste women were more likely to consent to intercourse and in any event, were less worthy of belief”.26 The majority
struck down a provision that was designed to protect sexual assault
complainants from such generalizations as a breach of the right to make
full answer and defence, because it was over-inclusive.27 Nonetheless,
they accepted that trial judges should exclude sexual history evidence if
it is irrelevant or its prejudicial potential substantially outweighs its
probative value.28 This reasoning was confirmed, and additional myths
identified in R. v. Osolin.29 In both cases, the Court identified concerns
about the possibility that a rape victim’s credibility might be unfairly
demeaned based on inaccurate generalizations about the behaviour,
truthfulness or character of sexual assault complainants, while upholding
the relevance of cross-examination on sexual history in the instant cases.
Although concerns about rape myths resonate with the substantive
equality focus on stereotyping, the Court did not explicitly connect the
concept of rape myths with the Charter right to equality until Mills.30
Justices McLachlin and Iacobucci held on behalf of a majority that:
Equality concerns must also inform the contextual circumstances in
which the rights of full answer and defence and privacy will come into
play. In this respect, an appreciation of myths and stereotypes in the
context of sexual violence is essential to delineate properly the
boundaries of full answer and defence. ... [T]he right to make full
answer and defence does not include the right to information that would
only distort the truth-seeking goal of the trial process.31

After Mills, the connection between substantive equality and excluding
stereotyping from sexual assault cases is clear. Banishing unfair stereotyping from sexual assault cases is characterized as protecting both
women’s equality and the truth-seeking functions of the trial.32 This dual
benefit becomes apparent when one focuses on the distorting effects that
arise when a trier of fact substitutes an unfair generalization about human
26

Id., at para. 23.
The majority’s failure to have regard to complainants’ equality rights was widely criticized. See, for example, Sheehy, supra, note 20; McInnes & Boyle, supra, note 20, at 365-66.
28
Seaboyer, supra, note 19.
29
Supra, note 20.
30
Supra, note 20.
31
Id., at 727 S.C.R., para. 90.
32
Id.; see also R. v. B. (W.), [2000] O.J. No. 2184, 145 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para. 146 (Ont.
C.A.).
27
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behaviour for a careful consideration of what happened on this occasion.
Concerns about unjust acquittals are front and centre in this regard.
Far less clear is how best to identify and avoid reasoning which is
based on stereotype. Christine Boyle and Marilyn MacCrimmon explain
that the risk of stereotyping arises when a trier of fact moves from
proven fact to an inference about consent or credibility by way of a
generalization. Before inferences are drawn, “the question should be
whether the underlying generalization is misleading, discriminatory, and
one that should be eliminated from the fact determination process.”33
However, a close analysis of the Supreme Court’s 2011 decisions
demonstrates that trial and appellate courts continue to find it difficult to
avoid stereotyped reasoning in sexual assault cases. While equality has
informed the substantive definition of consent, and legislative reforms
have improved aspects of trial procedure, attention to equality has not yet
thoroughly infused trial practice or appellate reasoning. Interestingly, this
failure is not caused by an absence of legal tools, or a lack of helpful
precedent. Rather, the equality reasoning that characterized legislative
reforms and judicial decisions during the 1990s seems to have been
marginalized within more recent trial practice and judicial decisions. In
the next section, I examine the three sexual assault decisions rendered by
the Court in 2011, and identify the persistent influence of prejudicial
generalizations about sexual assault complainants.

III. LOOKING FOR SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY IN THE SEXUAL
ASSAULT CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN 2011
The three sexual assault cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2011 share some common features. Each alleged sexual assault
took place in the context of a pre-existing family relationship. Each trial
turned on the question of consent. Each case was tried by judge alone,
and a written decision rendered, and so it is possible to investigate the
factual reasoning that led to the verdict. The cases also differ legally and
factually. I have already noted that various questions were brought to the
Court on appeal. In two cases, the alleged violence occurred between
spouses, and in one of these the relationship was in the course of being
dissolved. In one case, the complainant alleged that she was sexually
assaulted by her cousin. In this section, I address the cases in the order in
33
Boyle & MacCrimmon, supra, note 3, at 232. This article was cited with approval in R. v.
Darrach, supra, note 20, at paras. 33-34.
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which they were decided by the Court and identify some of the key
themes in each.
1. R. v. A. (J.A.)
JAA and the complainant were married, but in the process of separating. The complainant alleged that JAA sexually assaulted her one
morning when the children were at school and she was due at work. JAA
admitted to the sexual activity, but testified that it was consensual. The
complainant testified that, when the assault commenced, she bit JAA on
his middle finger “as hard as I could”. A police officer testified at trial
that, although he was not an expert in bite mark analysis, he had identified and photographed a possible tooth mark on the accused’s index
finger. The trial judge relied on this and other evidence in convicting
JAA.
After conviction, the defence obtained expert evidence from a forensic odontologist that the relevant mark could not have been made by a
tooth. This evidence formed the basis of a fresh evidence application
which was rejected by the Ontario Court of Appeal but accepted by the
Supreme Court of Canada. At trial and on appeal, JAA argued that the
complainant had a motive to fabricate her allegations because she was
facing the loss of her marital home and the obligation to pay an equalization settlement to the accused.34 The accused also relied upon the
complainant’s failure to try to escape the alleged sexual assault or call for
help and on the absence of physical injuries to the complainant.35 The
Crown framed this appeal as one that engaged squarely with the challenges of prosecuting sexual assault: “This case revolves around a
perennially-vexing area of law – the paucity of corroborating evidence
that often exists in the ‘she said, he said’ arena of sexualized violence.”36
The Court upheld JAA’s appeal on the basis that the fresh evidence
could reasonably have affected the outcome at trial. Characterizing the
case as “a close one”, Charron J. held on behalf of the majority that the
bite mark evidence was important to the trial judge, and that it was
proper to look for corroboration given that the accused’s testimony

34
35
36

A. (J.A.), supra, note 2 (Appellant’s Factum, at paras. 7, 29).
Id., at paras. 18, 22.
Id. (Respondent’s Factum, at para. 1).
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appeared plausible.37 Justice Charron suggested that the complainant’s
version of the events suffered from identifiable weaknesses:
It also seems implausible that the appellant, who had never been
depressed, violent, or aggressive in the 19 years the parties spent
together, suddenly turned into the suicidal, violent rapist described by
the complainant.38

A strong dissent was issued by Rothstein J. (Deschamps J. concurring). Justice Rothstein considered that, even if the fresh evidence were
believed, it could not have affected the outcome at trial. He suggested
that fresh evidence must be considered in the context of other evidence
adduced at the original trial, and concluded that the trial judge’s finding
that the accused was not capable of belief was supported by considerable
evidence. Justice Rothstein engaged directly with a number of the
propositions relied upon by the defence and by Charron J. to cast doubt
on the complainant’s version of events. The defence suggested that the
complainant’s decision to leave the house without showering or changing
her clothes in order to preserve evidence but taking time to get her shoes
and sunglasses “jarred somewhat” with her reportedly hysterical demeanour soon afterwards. Justice Rothstein observed in response to this
argument:
The fact that she fled the scene of the sexual assault and the accused
without taking time to clean herself up is entirely consistent with the
conclusion that she had just been sexually assaulted and wanted to
escape from her attacker.39

Engaging directly with Charron J.’s observation that the complainant’s
version of events was improbable, Rothstein J. wrote
I cannot agree. In addition to the findings of the trial judge I would add
the following. The undisputed evidence is that for some years this
couple had sexual relations twice a year, once on the accused’s birthday
and once in the summer; hardly suggestive of a spontaneous, passionate
advance by the complainant on June 8, 2007.40

Countering Charron J.’s suggestion that the alleged suicide threats were
out of character, Rothstein J. pointed out that the complainant testified in
37

Id., at paras. 10, 12, per Charron J.
Id., at para. 14.
39
Id., at para. 39, per Rothstein J.
40
Id., at para. 54. Paragraph 55 lists further reasons for finding the accused’s account
implausible.
38
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detail to similar threats made by the accused from the time that separation was first raised. Justice Rothstein concluded these threats “were
made to intimidate and cause distress to the complainant”.41 Accordingly,
Rothstein J. would have upheld the accused’s conviction.
Justice Rothstein’s dissent demonstrates the potential for a contextdriven analysis to facilitate substantive equality. It is implicit within his
reasoning that the majority was too quick to move from the fact that JAA
did not have a bite mark on his finger to the conclusion that the complainant’s credibility was thereby impugned to the extent of requiring a
new trial. Instead, Rothstein J. conducted a close analysis of the remaining evidence and the trial judge’s findings. Unlike the majority, Rothstein
J. provided a thorough analysis of the context of the alleged assault: the
breakdown of marriage and the complainant’s alleged motive to remove
the accused from the house. He explained why these circumstances
supported the complainant’s account rather than undermining it.42 Such
attention to context in the application of universal legal rules about
consent, credibility and reasonable doubt affords a potential corrective to
the prejudicial generalizations that threaten sexual assault trials.
Justice Charron made no reference to JAA’s arguments that the complainant had a motive to fabricate her allegations, but focused on the
difficulties of deciding guilt in the face of two conflicting accounts.
However, neither judgment engaged in detail with how W. (D.) directions
on reasonable doubt should be applied in a he said/she said case.43 Justice
Charron approved of the trial judge’s efforts to resolve the credibility
contest with physical corroborating evidence. This reasoning may be
misunderstood as a suggestion that it is (at best) risky to convict an
accused who testifies to consensual sexual activity in the absence of
corroborating evidence supporting non-consent. If such a principle were
re-enlivened, it would perpetuate the ideas that particular skepticism
should be reserved for sexual assault complainants, and that real rape
involves physical injury, and would be inconsistent with efforts to secure
substantive equality.44 However, such myths may prove resilient because,
41

Id., at para. 57.
Neither judgment refers to research that shows that intimate violence frequently occurs
for the first time or escalates during a relationship breakdown. See, for example, Douglas A.
Brownridge, “The Elevated Risk for Non-Lethal Post-Separation Violence in Canada” (2008) 23:1
J.I.V. 117.
43
Although Rothstein J. approved the trial judge’s approach in this case. See further Christine Boyle, “Reasonable Doubt in Credibility Contests: Sexual Assault and Sexual Equality” (2009)
13:4 I.J.E.P. 269.
44
This reasoning is also expressly disapproved by s. 274 of the Criminal Code.
42
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as Charron J. identified, they provide an attractive way to resolve
credibility battles about consent in these most difficult cases. The longing
for a straightforward rule by which to determine consent and credibility
is echoed in A. (J.).
2. R. v. A. (J.)
In A. (J.), a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that
a person cannot validly consent to sexual activity that is expected to
occur while he or she is unconscious. A. (J.) has received considerable
attention, in part because of its interpretation of consent and perhaps also
because it has been recast as being concerned with the acceptable limits
of “kinky sex” within a consensual adult relationship. However, while
the Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning extends to any sexual touching
that occurs when one party is unconscious, the factual context of A. (J.)
offers considerable reason to doubt the aptness of the kinky sex frame.
The complainant and accused were cohabiting, and had a young son.
The complainant provided a statement to police that the accused had
strangled her into unconsciousness before penetrating her anus with a
dildo. She told police that she had not consented to the strangulation or
the anal penetration. At trial, the complainant testified that she consented
to the strangulation and that she and the accused had discussed anal sex
and expressed an interest in it. She also testified that when she regained
consciousness, she went along with the anal penetration “in the spirit of
experimentation”. On cross-examination, she agreed that she and the
accused had once previously had consensual anal sex.
Justice Nicholas convicted the accused on the basis that she was satisfied that the complainant did not consent to the anal penetration. She
also held that the complainant could not, in any event, validly consent to
sexual touching expected to occur while she was unconscious. Justice
Nicholas described the cross-examination of the complainant as follows:
She was a most compliant witness and agreed to virtually each defence
suggestion put to her. Few of her answers were unprompted. To that
extent this was a typical cross-examination of a recanting complainant
in a domestic matter.45

Justice Nicholas’s concerns about the complainant’s testimony become
clearer when one reads the sentencing judgment. JA had a lengthy and
45

R. v. A. (J.), [2008] O.J. No. 1583, 2008 ONCJ 195, at para. 8 (Ont. C.J.).
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violent criminal record. He had committed three prior assaults on this
complainant, as well as other threatening behaviour towards her. Justice
Nicholas expressed concern that the complainant’s behaviour “fit well
with the profile of a battered woman”.46 JA appealed against his conviction, arguing that it was not open to Nicholas J. to find that the complainant did not consent, and that valid consent could be given to sexual
activity expected to occur while a complainant was unconscious.
The Ontario Court of Appeal held unanimously that the evidence at
trial was not capable of supporting a finding beyond a reasonable doubt
that the complainant did not consent.47 Justice Simmons (Juriansz J.A.
concurring) held that the trial judge erred in holding that a person cannot
consent in advance to sexual activity expected to occur when unconscious. Confining Ewanchuk to the circumstance in which a complainant
is conscious,48 Simmons J.A. held that permitting advanced consent is
consistent with the goals of protecting bodily integrity and autonomy in
sexual relationships.49 Justice LaForme dissented on this point, holding
that Ewanchuk requires a conscious complainant because it measures
consent by the state of mind of the complainant at the time of the sexual
activity.50
The Crown appealed as of right on the question of whether advanced
consent could be given to sexual activity that occurs when one party is
unconscious. The Crown argued for a nuanced approach to the concept of
autonomy within sexual assault:
In the context of sexual activity the concept of consent ought not to be
informed by a narrow liberal interpretation of autonomy, referenced
primarily by freedom from state interference in the expression of
sexuality. Rather the concept of consent ought to be given content that
is consistent with Charter values of dignity and equality, as well as
autonomy, and a recognition of the social reality in which choice is
constructed in specific types of human interaction.51

The Crown sought to draw on equality reasoning in delineating autonomy. It pressed the proposition that one must have regard to social
context in order to understand the complex interplay between choice,
46

[2008] O.J. No. 4814, 2008 ONCJ 624, at para. 12 (Ont. C.J.).
R. v. A. (J.), [2010] O.J. No. 1202, 253 C.C.C. (3d) 153, at paras. 55-60 and 114 (Ont.
C.A.), per Simmons J.A. (Juriansz J.A. concurring) and LaForme J.A., respectively.
48
Id., at paras. 74-76.
49
Id., at para. 66.
50
Id., at paras. 116-117, per LaForme J.A.
51
A. (J.), supra, note 2 (Appellant’s Factum, at para. 4).
47
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constraint and consent in intimate relationships. More particularly, the
Crown identified concerns about sexual and physical abuse and disparities of economic and emotional power as factors that render liberal
conceptions of autonomy problematic.52
The Crown’s approach was echoed and elaborated by the Women’s
Legal Education and Action Fund (“LEAF”) in its intervener’s factum.
Unlike the Crown, LEAF relied on the factual context of this case to
strengthen the argument against recognizing advanced consent.53 LEAF
questioned whether the complainant in this case did, in fact, consent.54
LEAF also identified that some women — particularly Aboriginals and
disabled women — are disproportionately likely to be subjected to sexual
assault, including assaults that occur when the complainant is unconscious. LEAF suggested that this social reality should inform the Court’s
approach to defining the limits of consent. A second intervener, the
federal Attorney General, set out its preferred approach to the statutory
interpretation of section 273.1 and argued that the value of protecting
individuals who are incapacitated or abused outweighs the freedom of a
small number who may choose to engage in dangerous activity.55
The respondent, JA, characterized this complainant as having agreed
to the charged activity, and this case as being “about real, communicated,
actual consent”.56 JA suggested that it would be “heavy handed” to
criminalize all unconscious sexual touching, including mundane contact
between loving couples, in order to protect against “some rare theoretical
case” of sexual abuse.57 Reading the four factums filed in this case, one
is struck by the profoundly different framings given to the facts. While
the Crown did not challenge the Court of Appeal’s ruling on factual
consent, its factum is haunted by the spectre of domestic violence. In
LEAF’s factum, this spectre becomes more substantial by the reintroduction of key facts from trial and through references to the empirical
realities of domestic violence and sexual assault. Concerns about
protecting women from abuse thereby became a very present dynamic in
this case. In stark contrast, according to the respondent’s factum, the
complainant was an enthusiastic and equal participant in sexual experi-
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Id., at para. 6.
Id. (Intervener’s Factum (Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund), at para. 3).
Id., at para. 21. I will return to this question below.
Id. (Intervener’s Factum (Attorney General of Canada), at para. 1).
Id. (Respondent’s Factum, at para. 6).
Id., at para. 62.
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mentation who is at risk of being denied “the right to make free
choices”.58
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that advanced consent to sexual touching cannot remain valid after unconsciousness. Chief
Justice McLachlin’s reasoning was grounded in statutory interpretation
of section 273.1 of the Code: “Parliament defined consent in a way that
requires the complainant to be conscious throughout the sexual activity
in question.”59 Chief Justice McLachlin identified a number of practical
difficulties inherent in permitting advanced consent and emphasized the
unique factors that differentiate consent in sexual assault from the rules
that shape the limits of consent in other areas of the law.
Justice Fish wrote in dissent, Binnie and LeBel JJ. concurring.
Adopting a formal liberal account of autonomy, Fish J. framed the case
as one in which the Court was invited to find that “yes in fact means no
in law.”60 He criticized the Crown and implicitly the majority reasoning
for limiting women’s autonomy by removing the choice to engage in
consensual sexual activity.61 Relying on the proposition that the complainant was “a willing and enthusiastic participant”, Fish J. considered
that JA should be acquitted.62
Comparing the factums filed in A. (J.) with the reasoning in the majority and dissenting judgments, it becomes apparent that the Court took
a relatively narrow view of the case, and that the dissent in particular
perpetuates some of the myths associated with sexual assault. I have
already noted that the trial judge disbelieved much of the complainant’s
testimony on cross-examination, including her assent that she had
previously engaged in consensual anal sex. Taking this view was, of
course, within Nicholas J.’s preserve as trial judge and primary finder of
fact. The Court of Appeal’s holding that it was not open to the trial judge
to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt about non-consent does not
disturb Nicholas J.’s conclusion about the credibility of the complainant’s
testimony on cross-examination. Justice Fish’s strong assertions about
the facts of A. (J.) sit uneasily with this trial record. According to Fish J.,
“the complainant in this case said yes, not no,”63 the complainant “freely
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Id., at paras. 6-7.
A. (J.), supra, note 2, at para. 33, per McLachlin C.J.C.
Id., at para. 71, per Fish J. (emphasis in original).
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Id., at paras. 112-114.
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consented”,64 she “agreed in advance”,65 “[t]his is not a case about a
woman who said no — at any time.”66 While Fish J. elsewhere discusses
the importance of the Crown’s burden of proof, it is not apparent from
the context of the passages from which these quotes are drawn that the
record in this case is ambiguous, and that the benefit of doubt regarding
consent was therefore given to JA. Underlying Fish J.’s emphatic
characterization of the complainant as a willing partner lies the logic that
if the Crown does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant withheld consent, she must in fact have consented. This simplification perpetuates the misconception that when an accused is acquitted
of sexual assault, it is necessarily because the complainant lied.
Justice Fish’s decision also reproduces a liberal account of the
privacy of sexual choices, and reasserts the proposition that the key
dynamic of concern in a case such as A. (J.) is between the accused and
the State. In advancing this point, Fish J. adopted a paraphrased version
of Pierre Trudeau’s famous remark that “there’s no place for the state in
the bedrooms of the nation.”67 Within Fish J.’s articulation, potential
complainants are allied with accused: they are the loving spouse who
requests a goodbye kiss in the morning, or the woman whose autonomy
is perfected by freely agreeing to unconventional sexual practices.68 This
reasoning denies the recognition in Mills that sexual assault complainant’s equality, privacy and dignity may often be in tension with the
accused person’s Charter rights.69 It similarly overlooks feminist observations that norms regarding the privacy of the marital home often
operate to conceal gendered violence from official notice.70
Chief Justice McLachlin’s decision is also less concerned with facts
other than the finding that JA was briefly unconscious. While a nuanced
conception of autonomy is implicit within the finding that an unconscious complainant cannot withdraw consent and therefore cannot give
64

Id., at para. 81.
Id., at para. 89.
66
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67
The Honourable Pierre Trudeau, Justice Minister (as he then was), quoted in “Trudeau’s
Omnibus Bill: Challenging Canadian Taboos” CBC TV clip (December 21, 1967), online: CBC
<http://archives.cbc.ca/politics/rights_freedoms/topics/538/>. See id., at para. 116.
68
See further Lise Gotell, “Governing Heterosexuality through Specific Consent: Interrogating the Governmental Effects of R. v. J.A.” 24 C.J.W.L. (forthcoming in 2012) [hereinafter
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valid consent, the majority’s reasoning is predicated on the statutory
language. However, as Fish J. showed, the majority interpretation of
sections 273.1 and 273.2 is not unassailable. By emphasizing the
indefeasibility of conscious, continuous and willing consent, McLachlin
C.J.C.’s decision is consistent with the outcome that would be indicated
by the principles of substantive equality as it protects women’s capacity
to choose when to say yes and when to withdraw their agreement to
sexual activity, and prevents behaviour that has been closely linked with
domestic violence. Nonetheless, the majority reasoning does not draw
explicitly on these substantive equality principles as do the arguments
advanced by the Crown and LEAF in their respective factums. Substantive equality seems to be relegated to a second-order principle that comes
into play when the more conventional tools of statutory interpretation
and stare decisis have failed to resolve a legal question. It would be a
shame if this implicit prioritization reflects the approach that the Court is
now taking to substantive equality in sexual assault.71
The Seaboyer/Osolin/Mills focus on myths and stereotypes went beyond defining the limits of the substantive law and into the messier
questions of proof and fact determination. In a case such as A. (J.),
substantive equality seems to demand a contextual inquiry into the power
differentials and difficulties of proof that justify a strong definition of
consent.72 Unfortunately, the Crown did not seek leave to appeal the
Court of Appeal’s decision regarding factual consent. It is strongly
arguable that no consent was given, according to the statutory standard.
The complainant’s evidence was that she consented to being choked into
unconsciousness, that she and JA had discussed anal penetration and
tried it on one prior occasion, and that she went along with the penetration when she regained consciousness. They had not talked about what
would occur this time. Taking this evidence at its highest, it seems to fall
short of the requirement that the complainant subjectively consent to “the
sexual activity in question”. The only relevance of prior anal intercourse
71
Chief Justice McLachlin’s decision in R. v. I. (D.A.), [2012] S.C.J. No. 5, 280 C.C.C. (3d)
127 (S.C.C.) offers another example of a judgment that accords with substantive equality outcomes
without using substantive equality reasoning. In I. (D.A.), the Court held that the statutory
requirements for testimonial competence of an intellectually disabled adult witness focus on the
witness’s practical understanding of the difference between truth and lies, and not on an abstract
understanding of the concept of truth. While adverting to the policy considerations in favour of
facilitating prosecution of sexual assaults committed on intellectually disabled victims, the Court
predicated its decision on statutory interpretation and did not discuss the equality rights of these
victims nor their particular vulnerability to stereotyping.
72
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is the prohibited inference that she was therefore more likely to have
consented on this occasion. The complainant’s decision to go along with
the penetration cannot retroactively alter the terms of her consent prior to
that time. Given the very real concerns about domestic violence in this
case, there is all the more reason to subject this evidence to a careful
contextual analysis and to make a self-conscious effort to avoid prejudicial generalizations when reasoning through consent.
All of this evidence became irrelevant, of course, once McLachlin
C.J.C. concluded that advanced consent was not possible. Nonetheless,
the Court of Appeal’s reasoning on factual consent seems to me to depart
from the high standard established in the Criminal Code. This departure
may indicate how difficult it can be to retain one’s focus on the particular
charged sexual activity, and to avoid reasoning according to prejudicial
generalizations about sexual relationships. The very human tendency to
substitute the answer to an easier question (she was seemingly willing to
try anal sex and had once done so) for detailed engagement with a harder
question (had she consented to this activity on this occasion?) may help
to explain the persistence of myths and stereotypes in this field.73
Furthermore, incorporating the difficulties associated with consent on
these facts may have strengthened McLachlin C.J.C.’s reasoning regarding the policy basis for limiting consent to a conscious complainant by
demonstrating the risks of domestic violence and coercion that accompany asphyxiation, in particular.74
3. R. v. H. (J.M.)
The complainant and accused in this case were cousins. At the time
of the alleged sexual assault, the complainant was 17 years old and the
accused five years older. On this occasion, a number of friends were
present at the accused’s house, and the complainant became somewhat
drunk. The complainant went to sleep in JMH’s bed. The complainant
testified that over her protests, JMH had sexual intercourse with her. She
washed, stayed awake until early the next morning, then woke her sister
and went home. The complainant wrote a poem about the incident, which
she posted on a website, and which was reproduced in the trial judgment.

ch. 9.
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A second alleged assault occurred some months later. She did not report
the alleged assaults for some time.
The accused testified. He denied both incidents, and denied all sexual contact with the complainant. The complainant’s sister also testified.
Her account of the morning after the first alleged assault was inconsistent
with that given by the complainant. The trial judge observed about this
inconsistency: “That evidence ... makes me wonder how many times S.
was at this home. How many times did she end up in Mr. H.’s bed?”75
While disbelieving the accused’s testimony, the trial judge had further
concerns about the poem written by the complainant. He analyzed
several passages from the poem, concluding that it was in some respects
inconsistent with the experience and emotions of a rape victim. Given its
centrality to the appeal, the relevant passage of the trial reasons is worth
quoting at length:
She describes the incident on February 11th as:
First taste
So bittersweet
Why?
First taste
So bittersweet
Hardly the words that describe a rape. Hardly the words that describe
an incident that is so damaging to her that she cannot cope with it. But
she doesn’t end there. She says,
Evil invading
Her body.
It’s too late
Regret
“Regret”? “Regret” conjures an image of someone who has made a
decision and wishes she had not made it. “Regret”. Why should she
regret if she has been raped? Why should she regret if she has been
violated? And why did she insist in going back to the same bed that she
had been violated in? She may be young, but she is 17.
75
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I suspect very strongly, when I read her poem, “First taste So
bittersweet”, that she was confused, that she wrestled with going into
that room. She said she went to the bed on her own and it wasn’t even
discussed. Why?76

The trial judge held that he was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity. The Crown
appealed, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence,
including by interpreting some passages from the poem in isolation from
the rest of the evidence. Justice Watt held for a unanimous Court that it is
an error of law to take an incorrect approach to the evidence and that, in
this case, the reasons suggest that the trial judge determined consent on a
“partial evidentiary predicate”.77 As consent must be determined subjectively, the poem should have been considered as a whole and in light of
the complainant’s testimony. Justice Watt would have sent the case back
to be retried. JMH obtained leave to appeal.
Before the Supreme Court of Canada, JMH argued that any error in
interpreting the poem was not an error in law and that the trial judgment
did not support the conclusion that the trial judge disregarded the
complainant’s testimony or the balance of the poem. The Crown argued
that the trial judge failed to consider the extracts from the poem in their
entire context, including the complainant’s testimony. The Crown
suggested that, had the trial judge considered this context, he would have
considered the possibility that the emotions described in the poem “were
consistent not only with experimentation, but also with being the victim
of a sexual assault by a trusted member of one’s family”.78
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the appeal and reinstated
JMH’s acquittal. Justice Cromwell held that a failure to apprehend the
evidence would constitute an error of law if it resulted from a piecemeal
approach, but concluded that the reasons given in this case did not
disclose such an error. He suggested that Watt J.A.’s conclusion that the
trial judge’s decision was based on two brief extracts from the poem was
not based on a fair reading of the trial judge’s reasons.79
The decision in H. (J.M.) is very brief. To the extent that it supports
the need for a complete analysis of the evidence, it certainly leaves room
for a substantive equality analysis to inform a trial judge’s reasoning.
However, the Court’s reasoning does not suggest that a trier of fact
76
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should follow any specific logic in reaching a verdict or reiterate that
inferences must be tested against the risk of engaging myths and stereotypes. Returning to the facts of H. (J.M.), this feels like a missed opportunity. As the Crown asserted, the question of what inferences may be
drawn from a poem or other evidence is conditioned by context. In this
case, the Crown suggested a plausible alternative interpretation of the
complainant’s poem but it too failed to make direct reference to the
requirements of substantive equality.
What could attention to substantive equality have added to H. (J.M.)?
First, it might have shed light on the importance of the trial judge’s
conclusion that the complainant had slept in JMH’s bedroom on other
occasions. If this were so, it does not speak to whether JMH and the
complainant had ever engaged in consensual sexual activity. Even less
can it tell us whether the complainant consented on the charged occasions. The trial judge’s reasoning implies that a teenaged girl who sleeps
in her male cousin’s bed must know and accept the risk that he will make
sexual overtures. Or, more bluntly, that by entering JMH’s bedroom, the
complainant consented to intercourse. Lise Gotell has argued that
Canadian judicial discourses posit an ideal rape victim who takes active
steps, but fails, to protect herself against sexual assault. Women and girls
who do not take such steps are at risk of being denied the law’s protection, regardless of whether they were capable of protecting themselves in
the expected manner.80 Unfortunately, the Crown did not argue this line
in H. (J.M.), and neither appeal decision critically considers the trial
judge’s reasoning on this point.
Second, sustained attention to substantive equality may have supplied the context within which it might make sense for a rape victim to
feel regret about a sexual assault, and to use the word “bittersweet” to
describe a non-consensual encounter. The Crown argued this proposition
in its factum.81 Justice Cromwell did not engage with it, except to
observe that the trial reasons disclose that the trial judge considered all of
the relevant evidence before finding a reasonable doubt. If the judicial
expulsion of myths and stereotypes from sexual assault trials is to be
effective, however, appeal courts must be willing to engage with the
factual reasoning of trial judges. In H. (J.M.), before concluding that the
poem’s words and the complainant’s behaviour were capable of raising a
reasonable doubt, the Court should have considered whether the infer80
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ences necessary to sustain that doubt were based solely, or primarily, on
myths about how an ideal victim avoids sexual assault and responds to
the experience of being assaulted.

IV. CONCLUSION
There has been a considerable evolution in the law and trial process
of sexual assault, and the effects of this evolution can be seen in the
Supreme Court’s 2011 caseload. We have moved beyond the rule that
there can be no rape in marriage, Crown prosecutors are willing to lay
charges in this context, and delay in disclosure is no longer as high a bar
to prosecution. Feminist-influenced reforms have helped to protect
complainants from some of the worst excesses of cross-examination. The
Mills proposition that equality and privacy rights must be balanced
against the accused’s fair trial rights instantiates a paradigm shift in
traditional conceptions of the criminal trial as a battle between an individual accused and the powerful mechanisms of the State. Nonetheless, trial
and appeal judges have found it difficult to fulfil the potential of equality
reasoning, particularly when considering consent and credibility.
Close analysis of the cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada
in 2011 demonstrates the resilience of prejudicial reasoning about sexual
assault complainants. In A. (J.) and H. (J.M.), the (contested) sexual
history between the accused and complainant was recruited to discredit
the complainant’s assertion that she did not consent. In A. (J.A.) and
A. (J.), the notion that women fabricate sexual assault complaints to gain
a strategic advantage on separation underpinned defence arguments and
some judges’ reasoning. In A. (J.A.) and H. (J.M.), a reasonable doubt
was seemingly founded in part on the lack of corroboration of the
complainant’s story. In H. (J.M.), that doubt was strengthened by
reasoning about how women and girls react to sexual assault, and how
they should protect themselves against it. All of these cases rely to some
extent on the proposition that women consent to sexual activity before
being prompted by regret or vengeance to fabricate allegations of sexual
assault. Closer attention to substantive equality in each of these cases
might help contest some or many of these stereotypes.
As we might expect, the Supreme Court cases are also unrepresentative of sexual assault in some ways. For example, none of these complainants is identified as Aboriginal — and yet there is considerable
reason to believe that Aboriginal women are disproportionately vulner-
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able to sexual assault. No generalizations can be drawn from these cases
about the cultural sensitivity of police investigation or the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, both of which have been subject to criticism
elsewhere.82 The cases do not allow me to investigate the possibility that
women who are multiply marginalized may face an even more difficult
time establishing their credibility at trial. In short, while these cases
provide a glimpse of the continued threat that gendered stereotypes
present to the contemporary practice of sexual assault law, they say
nothing about the compounding effect of race.
Twenty-seven years of equality have brought considerable positive
advances in sexual assault law and practice. The tools to support equality-based reasoning are already largely present in the Criminal Code and
case law. Reviewing contemporary cases suggests that the next challenge
is to weave attention to substantive equality more fully into the fact
determination and reasoning practices of lawyers, trial judges and
appellate courts.83 The Supreme Court has an important role to play in
modelling equality reasoning given the importance and impact of its
decisions and the extent to which its cases can be fully argued. Moving
beyond the notion of equality as a second-order principle requires the
Court to develop and exercise a habit of reasoning in accordance with its
equality jurisprudence.
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